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ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the 
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, Deceased, 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the 
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, Deceased, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A., a 
National Banking Association, MICHAEL 
PETERS, PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM, 
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE JONES, 
Appellees. 
No. 14161 
APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
AND BRIEF IN SUPPORT THEREOF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Appellant above-named, pursuant to Rule 76 (e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, respectfully petitions this 
Court for a rehearing in the above-entitled matter and 
alleges that in making its decision herein, this Court erred 
in the following particulars: 
1. This Court erroneously failed to consider whether 
the retention of the incidents of ownership by the settlor 
constituted possession of a legal or equitable estate in 
real property within the meaning of the distributive share 
statute, Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as 
amended). 
2. This Court erroneously concluded that the settlor's 
retention of all incidents of ownership was not sufficient 
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to render the subject trust illusory or invalid. 
3. This Court erred in affirming the decision of the 
lower court. 
DATED this 5th day of May, 1976. 
Respectfully submitted, 
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS, 
LEONARD & TATE. 
( Gary/A. Trank 
Attorneys'tor Appellant 
1515 Walker Bank Building 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
ETTA JEAN HORN, Administratrix of the 
Estate of THRESSA G. JONES, Deceased, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF UTAH, N.A. , a 
National Banking Association, MICHAEL 
PETERS, PEGGY PETERS CUNNINGHAM, 
KAYLEEN JONES and JANICE JONES, 
Appellees. 
No. 14161 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
THIS COURT ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO CONSIDER WHETHER 
THE RETENTION OF THE INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP BY THE 
SETTLOR CONSTITUTED POSSESSION OF A LEGAL OR EQUIT-
ABLE ESTATE IN REAL PROPERTY WITHIN THE MEANING OF 
THE DISTRIBUTIVE SHARE STATUTE, SECTION 74-4-3, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1953, AS AMENDED). 
The decision of this Court erroneously concludes that 
the settlor of the subject trust, Dr. Clarence T. Jones, 
" * * * completely divested himself of title in the lands 
in question, and there was nothing left to set apart to the 
surviving widow ... . ." when the settlor executed and delivered 
to the Trustee a warranty deed in and to the real property 
constituting a portion of the trust corpus. Appellant would 
concede the propriety of this Court's holding if the distri-
butive share statute, Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
(1953, as amended), was limited in its application to real 
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property, bare legal title to which was possessed by the 
deceased husband during the course of the marriage. However, 
the pertinent statute includes within its mandate real pro-
perty in which the deceased husband possessed, " * * * legal 
or equitable estates . . . " during the course of the mar-
riage. Accordingly, the primary issue presented by this 
proceeding is not resolved by simply concluding that the 
distributive share interest of a surviving spouse may be 
successfully defeated by the machinations of a husband who 
divests himself of bare legal title but by the same stroke 
of the pen retains complete control and dominion over his 
property. 
The determination of this issue is separate and apart 
from any consideration involving fraud or issues of whether 
the settlor's conduct is so fraught with bad faith as to 
render the final fruits of his efforts illusory. Simply 
put, a revocable inter vivos trust does not have to be 
declared invalid because of fraud or other considerations 
that would render the trust illusory, before the distri-
butive share statute may be enforced against real property 
constituting a portion of the trust res. Assuming for 
the purposes of this argument that the circumstances sur-
rounding the creation of this subject trust were not tainted 
with question of fraud, conduct would render the trust 
illusory or other considerations of public policy, this Court 
would still be faced with the ultimate question of whether 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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the retention of dominion and control by the settlor consti-
tuted possession of a legal or equitable estate in the real 
property. 
By its decision herein, this Court has held that an 
individual may retain the right to manage and control his 
property without having any legally recognizable relation-
ship thereto. In the past, there were four possible rela-
tionships or estates recognized in contemplation of law: 
(1) The owner or holder of bare legal title such as a 
seller who retains legal title for security purposes only; 
(2) The owner or holder of an equitable interest which has 
been broadly defined as one holding any interest that will 
be legally protected, such as the rights of possession or 
control; (3) The owner or holder of both legal title and 
equitable estates; and, (4) One who owns or holds neither 
legal title nor equitable interest. By its decision herein, 
this Court has created a fifth estate encompassing owners 
or holders of all benefits of ownership, such as the rights 
to possession and sale, lease, investment, management and 
all controls over the real property, which incidents of owner- . 
ship are legally protectable but which, by the decision herein, 
are not legally recognized to exist. The incongruity of this 
fifth estate is obvious. 
Should the decision of this Court be allowed to stand, 
a question arises as to whether real property transferred 
to a revocable inter vivos trust wherein the settlor retains 
3. 
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the power to amend or revoke the trust and thereby free any 
or all of the trust corpus from the terms thereof and also 
control the sale, investment or management of the subject 
property, is includable in the gross estate of the settlor 
for inheritance tax purposes. Section 59-12-3 Utah Code 
Annotated (1953, as amended) provides, in part: 
"The value of the gross estate of a 
decedent shall be determined by including 
the value * * * of all property, real or 
personal, within the jurisdiction of this 
state, and any interest therein, whether 
tangible or intangible, which shall pass 
to any person, in trust or otherwise, by 
testamentary disposition or by law of 
inheritance or succession of this or any 
other state or country, or by deed, grant, 
bargain, sale or gift made in contempla-
tion of the death of the grantor, vendor 
or donor, or intended to take effect in 
possession or enjoyment at or after his 
death . . . " . • ' 
If, as this Court holds, ff * * * that the settlor by 
his conveyance to the trustee completely divested himself 
of title in the lands in question, and there was nothing 
left to set apart to the surviving widow . v . ff, because 
the settlor was not possessed of a legal or equitable 
estate in or to the real property, appellant submits that 
the settlor has relinquished any and all interest in and 
to the real property and the same should not be included 
in his gross estate for inheritance tax purposes. On the 
other hand, if the settlor retained sufficient interest in 
the property to include the same within his gross estate, 
this interest should also be sufficient to apply the 
4 . \ : • • ; • ; ; < ' - ' / ^ 
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distributive share statute. The same interest that permits 
the state to benefit through the assessment of an inheri-
tance tax should also be sufficient to bestow the statutor-
ily intended benefit on a surviving spouse. 
A conclusion that a revocable inter vivos trust was 
not tainted with fraud or other factors requiring a finding 
that the same is illusory or contrary to public policy but 
that the retention of the powers of ownership by the settlor 
constituted possession of a legal or equitable estate in 
real property during the marriage, does not require that 
the entire trust be declared void or invalid. To the 
contrary, the proper relief and the relief sought by appel-
lant herein is to either set the trust aside to the extent 
of the surviving spouse's interest, or impose a constructive 
trust against the real property constituting a part of the 
trust corpus to the extent of the surviving spousefs statu-
tory interest. As stated in 42 Kentucky Law Journal, Inter 
Vivos Trusts and the Election Rights of a Surviving Spouse, 
616 (1954 at 631): 
"III. The Newman v. Dore concept that a 
transfer although valid as to all other 
persons may nevertheless be invalid as 
against a surviving spouse is sound, for 
it recognizes the policy underlying the 
election statutes. 
"However, the courts should abandon the 
practice of refusing to lay down precise 
rules in regard to the reserved powers 
sufficient to invalidate a transfer, for 
it has resulted only in uncertainty and 
confusion. 
5-; 
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"IV. It is submitted that the most satis-
factory solution to this problem lies in 
the adoption of a rule which declares 
invalid as against a surviving spouse all 
gratuitous inter vivos transfers in trust 
to the extent to which a deceased spouse 
retains either a power of revocation, or 
amendment, or consumption of the principal 
of the trust, or any combination of these 
powers. 
"The rule should be applied whether the 
deceased spouse died intestate or testate. 
The trust, if otherwise valid, however, 
should not be set aside in toto, but only 
to the extent required to satisfy the 
survivor's forced share. 
"This solution permits the one spouse to 
freely alienate his property during his 
lifetime and at the same time protects 
the survivor from disinheritance by means 
of a device which will accomplish a 
result which the election statutes pre-
vent the decedent from accomplishing 
by will." 
Accordingly, this Court should recognize that the 
incidents of ownership reserved by the settlor in the trust 
that gave rise to this proceeding constituted possession of 
at least an equitable estate in the real property constituting 
a portion of the trust corpus, and that the trust should either 
be invalidated to the extent of the surviving spouse's interest, 
or a constructive trust imposed against the real property to 
the extent of the surviving spouse's interest. Anything less 
contravenes both the clear wording and stated purpose of 
Section 74-4-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended). 
THIS COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE SETTLOR'S 
RETENTION OF ALL INCIDENTS OF OWNERSHIP WAS NOT 
SUFFICIENT TO RENDER THE SUBJECT TRUST ILLUSORY OR 
INVALID. 
6. 
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Appellant respectfully submits that a careful review 
of the factual circumstances preceding and surrounding the 
creation of the subject trust by Dr. Clarence T. Jones com-
pels the conclusion that the transfer of the bare legal 
title to the real property to the trustee did not include 
a relinquishment of the settlor's incidents of ownership 
and Dr. Jones remained the sole beneficial owner exercising 
the same degree of control and dominion over the subject 
property as enjoyed prior to the transfer thereof. The 
effect of creating a revocable inter vivos trust that would 
merely transfer bare legal title while allowing full control 
over the property was adequately explained to Dr. Jones by 
a Mr. Thomas C. Cuthbert, the trust officer for respondent 
First Security Bank of Utah, N.A. (Exhibit 3, p. 3). There 
is no clearer evidence to establish the fact that Dr. Jones 
jealously protected his right to exercise unrestrained 
control over the subject property than the declared state-
ment by Dr. Jones set forth in the Lease Agreement under 
date of August 1, 1961 (Exhibit 4) wherein it is acknowledged: 
ffI, Clarence T. Jones, state that I am the 
beneficial owner of the premises leased herein, 
and the Seller referred to in Paragraph No. 3 
of this Agreement, and hereby agree to all the 
terms and provisions hereof insofar as they 
relate to or place any obligation upon me." 
(Exhibit 4, p. 4) 
Accordingly, the record herein is subject to no other 
interpretation but that the settlor accepted the invitation 
to transfer the bare legal title to the real property to the 
• ' ' . : • / 1 . • • ' ' ' • , • • . ' r • ' • / • : • • 
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trustee while retaining the full control enjoyed by the 
settlor prior to the transfer. 
While appellant respectfully submits that the retention 
of the incidents of ownership to this degree renders the 
trust illusory, it is further submitted that this inescap-
able conclusion does not require that the entire trust be 
totally invalidated. Again, appellant suggests that the 
proper remedy would be an invalidation of the trust to the 
extent of the surviving spouse's interest or, in the alter-
native, the imposition of a constructive trust against the 
real property constituting a portion of the trust res. with 
the surviving spouse being designated, in legal effect, a 
tenant in common with the trustee. Free v. Little, et al, 
31 Utah 449, 88 Pac. 407 (1907). 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons herein stated, appellant respectfully 
submits that the Petition for Rehearing should be granted. 
DATED this ^ day of May, 1976. 
NELSON, HARDING, RICHARDS, 
LEONARD & TATE 
J? rant 
Attorneys for Appellant 
1515 Walker Bank Building 
Post Office Box 2465 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing Appellant's Petition 
for Rehearing and Brief in Support Thereof to Heber Grant 
Ivins, Attorney for Appellees, 75 North Center, American 
Fork, Utah 84003, this 6th day of May, 1976, by first-class 
mail, postage prepaid. 
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